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LABOR PREEMPTION: STRIKING WORKERS' RIGHT TO COLLECT
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS-New York Telephone Co. v. New York

State Department of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The payment of unemployment insurance benefits to strikers has
long been a hotly contested political issue, with state legislatures producing a variety of statutory plans to resolve and regulate the area.'
Some states flatly refuse to compensate employees who are direct participants in a strike, 2 while others condition benefits on the employer's
continued operations during the strike3 or on the employer's violation
of the collective bargaining agreement." Strikers qualify for benefits in
some states only if they are protesting hazardous conditions,5 have
been laid off from a subsequent job, 6 or are not in the grade or class
financing the dispute.'
The conflict has moved in recent years from the political arena to
judicial forums, where state statutes which confer such benefits have
been challenged on constitutional grounds. The challenges are premised on the contention that the payments, by providing strikers with
an economic weapon, substantially disrupt the federal policy of free
collective bargaining and thus are void under the supremacy clause.,
Challengers maintain that state provisions for strikers conflict with and
are preempted by the national mandate of neutrality in the bargaining

process. 9
1. For a comprehensive discussion of state statutes and their application, see
Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U.
CHI. L. REV. 294 (1950), and Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 94 (1975).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Page 1975).
3. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 383-30(4) (1976).
4. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (1978).
5. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1193(D) (West Supp. 1978).
6. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 421-29(8) (1978).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.06 (West 1972).
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides that "Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Thus state laws are preempted if they conflict
with federal policy, or if they touch areas wherein Congress intended to occupy the
field to the exclusion of state regulation.
The federal policy of free collective bargaining is expressed in the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976) and in the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 (1976). Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1337, 1352 (1976).
9. The preemption doctrine has thus been invoked to strike down Hawaii's compensation provision in Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor and Industrial Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976); to order further proceedings in a
dismissed challenge to Rhode Island's statute in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d

Published by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit responded to the
challenge in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department
of Labor.'1 The court found no evidence of preemption and thus
upheld the constitutionality of New York's unemployment insurance
provision for striking workers. In carving out an area of protected
state activity, the decision reconciled a First Circuit formula for assessing the extent of preemption" with the rationale from a recent and
2
arguably distinguishable Supreme Court case.' The result, which
varies from the general pattern of preemption in labor-related areas
and from prior cases overturning benefits to strikers, is indicative of a
recent trend toward protecting state legislation which arguably falls
within the federal purview.
Recent cases suggest a trend toward protection of state activity by
the Court in areas other than labor preemption. In the area of labor
preemption the Court has until recently tended to accord greater protection to federal policy. Whether a state unemployment compensation
plan which includes striking workers conflicts with national labor
policy will be decided by the Supreme Court, which has granted certiorariin New York Telephone. '
Even if the .Court finds that New York's unemployment benefits
statute is preempted by the federal policy, the Second Circuit's careful
analysis will have served propitiously to frame for resolution a significant constitutional question. This note will analyze the reasoning
underlying the New York Telephone decision, and other factors likely
to be considered by the Court on review.
II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In July, 1971, The Communication Workers of America (CWA)
called a nationwide strike against the Bell telephone system when contract settlements were not reached with representative pattern-setting
companies.' A few days later, an agreement was reached, and the
CWA recommended a return to work pending a ratification vote by
mail. Some 38,000 CWA members employed by the New York Telephone Company refused to return to work, and remained on strike for
seven months after all other Bell contracts were ratified.
449 (1st Cir. 1973); and to deny summary judgment when Michigan's law was under
attack in Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
10. 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
11. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
12. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
13. 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
14. Under this system of pattern-settlement, the contracts reached with selected
companies would serve as standards for settlement throughout the Bell system.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/11
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Pursuant to New York's unemployment insurance law,' 5 which
allows striking workers to collect benefits after an eight week waiting
period, the CWA members collected a total of $43,000,000 in
unemployment compensation at an average rate of $75 per week per
person. Like most state compensation systems, New York's is funded
by employer contributions, so the benefits paid to strikers were debited
to New York Telephone Company's account.
In a suit filed in district court, the telephone company sought to
recover its contributions to the fund which were paid out because of
the strike and to have the statute declared unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes benefits to striking workers.
III.

HOLDING OF THE COURT

The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
the payment of benefits to be state interference on behalf of strikers, in
conflict with the federal labor policy of free collective bargaining, and
hence unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that
"Congress has not expressed an intent to preempt State unemployment
compensation laws that provide benefits to strikers. . . . [I]t has
evinced an intention to leave the States free to regulate in this area.""
The court concluded that "the conflict between New York's statute
and the broad federal policy of free collective bargaining . . . is one
which Congress has decided to tolerate." 8
The court stated that the crucial inquiry in a preemption case such
as this one is whether Congress intended this field to be unregulated
and left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces." I A finding that Congress did so intend would force a conclusion that New
York's statutory regulation in this area is preempted. In its ensuing
analysis of congressional intent, the court examined the legislative
histories of the National Labor Relations Act20 and Title IX of the
Social Security Act, 2 ' and found evidence that Congress did not intend
to forbid such benefits. That evidence consists largely of congressional
15. 17 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 590.9, 592.1 (McKinney 1977).
16. 434 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. 566 F.2d at 395.
18. Id.
19. 566 F.2d 388, 391, (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) and NLRB v. Nash-Finch
Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971)).
20. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (Supp. V 1975)).
21. Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 901-910, 49 Stat. 639-45 (1935) (now the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3309 (Supp. V 1975)).
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reluctance to define specifically the permissable scope of state legislation, despite congressional awareness of opposition to certain state
unemployment benefits plans. 2
The interpretation of congressional intent, which forms the basis
of the court of appeals' decision, represents one element of a two23
pronged standard developed in a previous labor preemption case
'
dealing with unemployment benefits." The second element of that
standard consists of a factual analysis of state impact on federal
policy. The impact analysis had been relied on previously in finding
federal preemption: courts will find preemption where the state activity
has significant impact on the national policy favoring free collective
bargaining. Some courts were persuaded that employers suffer a disadvantage at the negotiating table if their employees know they can rely
on unemployment compensation."
There was Supreme Court precedent, however, for using only the
congressional intent approach,26 and this approach enabled the court
to uphold, in contrast to prior cases, the validity of New York's
payments.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Labor Preemption Pattern

Since the passage of the major labor legislation in the 1930's and
1940's,27 the Court has generally tended to expand the scope of federal
22. For a history of the state plans generally, see Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 YALE L.J. 461 (1940), and Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21 (1945). The plans were formulated in order for states to qualify for credits under the Social Security Act, note 20
supra. State plans had to comply with the new national labor policy, and could not disqualify someone who refused new work if: a) the position was open due to a labor
dispute, b) the wages or work conditions were substantially less favorable than those
for similar work in that locality, or c) the individual would be required to join or resign
a labor union as a condition to employment. There were no specific provisions for disqualifying strikers, although a model draft bill followed by several states contained
such a provision.
23. Grinnel Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
24. The unemployment benefits cases are distinguished from those involving
welfare payments to strikers; the decisions there have been founded on compelling
state interest. See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 412 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.J.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3791 (1977); and ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
25. Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor and Industrial Relations,
405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976).
26. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
27. The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (now codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (Supp. V 1975)), and The Labor Management Relations Act, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (now at 29 U.S.C. §§ 183, 186 (Supp. V 1975)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/11
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preemption in labor law. The result is a judicial approach which
stresses the importance of national policy and the danger of state interference with national policy and which favors a finding of preemption of state law. 8
The usual analysis in labor preemption cases is represented by San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.? Union organizers were enjoined by a state court from picketing a lumber business, on the grounds
that the union was not a properly designated collective bargaining unit.
The court granted damages to the lumber company for the pickets'
disruption of their business. Despite the fact that the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) subsequently declined jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court found that the state was prevented from regulating conduct arguably protected or prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Thus the picketing, which arguably fell within the
NLRB's grant of jurisdiction could not be regulated in any way by the
state, and California's award of damages was without force.
The rationale of the Garmon decision rests on the theory of primary jurisdiction. The Court asserted that potential conflicts of
regulation were avoided by congressional delegation of jurisdiction to
the NLRB; 30 state regulation of an activity even arguably within the
NLRB's regulatory authority creates the possibility of conflict. The
national policy is thus served only if states defer to NLRB adjudication, although there have been some exceptions carved out on a
piecemeal basis.' Garmon represents a commitment to "an expansive
32
concept of preemption" in labor cases.
It was within this framework that the Second Circuit was faced
with the attack on New York's unemployment benefit statute. The
Garmon case, however, involved an overlap of state and federal regulation of labor activities. 3 The state provision in New York Telephone
does not directly prohibit, restrain, sanction or encourage an arguably
protected or prohibited activity. The Second Circuit was not confront28. 18A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, Kheel, Labor Law, § 9.01 at 8 (1978).
29. 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
30. Id. at 242.
31. The states' ability to legislate in the following areas has been established:
violence on the picket line, United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); mass picketing and the blocking of entrance to a factory,
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942);
defamation, Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53 (1966);
picketing by employees outside the scope of the National Labor Relations Act, Hanna
Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
32. Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon,
72 COL. L. REV. 469, 470 (1972).
33. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 452 (1973).
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ing a statute which directly controls conduct in labor activities; rather
the operation of the New York statute allegedly creates a situation
which indirectly influences free collective bargaining. This difference
to apply the formula developed in Grinpermitted the Second3 Circuit
4
nel Corp. v. Hackett.

B.

The Grinnell Formula

A two-pronged standard to resolve the preemption issue was articulated by the First Circuit in Grinnell. The district court had dismissed
a suit challenging Rhode Island's statute which authorized unemployment compensation to strikers after a six-week waiting period. The
district court relied on a welfare benefits case" in which the First Circuit had recommended a "balancing process . . . in which both the

degree of conflict and the relative importance of the federal and state
interests are assessed." 6
The First Circuit, in remanding Grinnell, pointed out that the trial
record was insufficient for assessing state interest in unemployment
benefits, as distinguished from welfare benefits, and that there were
other issues to be considered. Noting the distinction between this
"unusual" preemption situation and the Garmon direct regulation
cases,3" the court outlined a two-pronged approach suitable for this
type of case. The court said that it was necessary to consider the
following: a) whether preemption can be discerned from congressional
intent, absent any express indication; and b) whether in the absence of
unambiguous intent, the state activity has such a significant impact on
federal labor policy as to be .preempted regardless of state interest.3"
In order to assess congressional intent when there are conflicting
indicators, the court recommended taking note of congressional awareness of the issue, opportunities to act, unsuccessful attempts to incorporate specific language into the relevant statutes, and comparisons
with analogous areas where Congress may have specifically forbidden
or permitted state activity. 9 As for the significance of the state
statute's impact on federal policy, the court stressed the need for a
well-developed factual record, comprised of hard data and expert testimony. To find preemption, the impact must be significant enough to
outweigh any strong state interest in the challenged activity. The impact must be severe enough to discredit a claim that unemployment
34.
35.

475 F.2d 449 (1973).
ITT Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).

36.

Id. at 992.

37.

475 F.2d at 461.

38.

Id. at 457.

39.

475 F.2d at 454-57.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/11
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benefits, like welfare benefits, are a merely peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act.' 0 The court cautioned that a plaintiff would need to prove a causal relationship between the receipt of
benefits and longer, costlier strikes. Proof of causation would require
studies on statistically significant numbers of persons actually receiving
unemployment benefits."
The Grinnell formula was not, of course, binding on the Second
Circuit, but it offered a pragmatic approach to this knotty area of preemption. The formula is applied as follows: a finding of clear congressional intent, to preempt or not, would be dispositive. If congressional
intent is too ambiguous, a court would turn to probative evidence of
the state activity's impact on the federally balanced labor policy. Proof
of significant impact would generally compel a finding of preemption,
subject to the mitigating effect of two variables included in the formula. First, a sufficiently strong state interest,' 2 such as protecting the
welfare of its citizens or preventing the secondary economic effects of
labor disputes, could preclude a finding of infringement. Second, inferences drawn from congressional inaction could likewise preclude a
finding of infringement. Thus, if a court finds infringement but also
finds that the state and federal interests are closely balanced, it could
properly decline to find preemption if it also finds congressional
awareness of state regulations in the area along with a congressional
failure to act.' 3
Most courts have bypassed the congressional intent aspect of the
Grinnell formula, or concluded that the intent is at best ambiguous,
and instead have looked to the evidence of impact. In Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. State of Hawaii Department of Labor," a district court
examined statistical data, attitudinal studies, and union leaflets before
concluding that the benefits are an intrusion into the federal process of
40.

359 U.S. at 243.-Such peripheral concerns, according to Garmon, provide ex-

ceptions to the preemption doctrine. See note 31 supra.
41. The court in Grinnell was presented with a study of welfare payments and
food stamps for strikers. Only 17% of the strikers in the study received aid comparable
to unemployment benefits, and the court declined to find that such a small group
could influence the strike-related decisions of the majority. Additional evidence of
causation consisted of six interviews with representatives from labor, management,
and state agencies. The court found the interviews "oversimplistic ... conclusory, and
... expectable." 475 F.2d at 458-59.
42. The state interest must be one "so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that ...we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act." 475 F.2d at 459, (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244). The weight given to states'
interests "in the scheme of our federalism" is discussed in Teamsters v. Morton, 377
U.S. 252, 257 (1964).
43. 475 F.2d at 457.
44. 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii, 1976).
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free collective bargaining. In striking down Hawaii's statute, the court

was especially concerned with the pressure brought to bear in forcing
employers into premature settlements."' Similarly, the district court in
Dow Chemical v. Taylor" rejected the notion that the issue could be
decided on inferred congressional intent. "This court does not believe
. . . that congressional inaction or failure to pass particular amend-

ments to unemployment tax laws results in a definitive statement of
congressional intent.'"'I
The Supreme Court dismissed, for lack of a federal question, an
employer's appeal in Kimbell, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission of New Mexico." The dismissal let stand a state supreme court
decision upholding limited benefits to strikers, but there is speculation
that the dismissal was based on Kimbell's poor evidentiary record and
the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide the issue absent evidence of
significant impact.' 9

The Second Circuit in New York Telephone made a threshold
determination of congressional intent, and found no need to consider
the impact of New York's compensation provision. The court carefully
analyzed the factors"0 suggested by Grinnell, beginning with congressional awareness of the issue. Opposition to unemployment benefits

for strikers was expressed in early congressional hearings, yet a Senate
committee report not only recommended that the states be free to
establish any system they wish, but also cited New York as having a

plan worthy of congressional acceptance."
Additionally, the court discussed the unsuccessful attempts to incorporate amendments specifically excluding strikers from any state
plan. The House version of the Hartley Bill5 2 recommended such an

exclusion, but the exclusion was not contained in the final Senate ver45. Id. at 279-80. The court concluded that even an employer's perception of the
benefits as disadvantageous is evidence of impact on the bargaining process.
46. 57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
47. Id. at 108.
48. 429 U.S. 804 (1976).
49. Brief for Appellee, New York Telephone Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor,
566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977). Whatever the grounds for dismissal, Kimbell has not
generally been interpreted as dispositive of the preemption issue. See Dow Chemical
Co. v. Taylor, 482 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii
Dep't of Labor and Industrial Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976); and New
York Telephone Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (1977). Contra, Super
Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
51. 566 F.2d at 392-93 (referring to S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1935)).
52. 566 F.2d at 394 (referring to H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, at 158 (1948)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/11
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sion. Similarly, President Nixon's proposal to discontinue payments to
strikers was rejected." The court inferred a reluctance to intrude into
the states' chosen plans. Such an inference is proper according to Grinnell: "Congressional awareness of the problem and its ability to
resolve it finally and specifically, may . . . in a closely balanced situation, be sufficient justification for upholding the state action." 5
As recommended in Grinnell, the Second Circuit also considered
the specificity of congressional action in other areas. New York Telephone pointed to several federal statutes," including the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act (which makes benefits specifically payable to participants in lawful strikes),5" the Food Stamp Act of 1964" 7
(which expressly prohibits the disqualification of strikers who are
otherwise eligible), and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program 8 (which allows states to determine whether to include
strikers), as indicative of congressional ability to clearly express its intent in comparable areas when it so chooses.
This analysis led the court to conclude that there was no clear preemptive intent with regard to unemployment compensation laws that
provide benefits to strikers. 59 To the contrary, the court inferred permission for the states to legislate as they choose in this area.
As support for its emphasis on congressional intent and for its conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt, the Second Circuit
turned to Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory," a
Supreme Court case dealing with an Ohio statute which denied
unemployment benefits. Hodory provided a strong rationale which
helped the Second Circuit to decide New York Telephone on the basis
of intent.
C.

The Hodory Rationale

Plaintiff Hodory was an innocent victim of the secondary effects
of a labor dispute. His place of employment, a U.S. Steel plant in
Youngstown, was closed due to strikes at U.S. Steel owned coal mines
53. 115 CONG. REC. 1853 (1969). House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Mills explained that "there are two States which will pay unemployment benefits when
employees are on strike ... [T]hat is their privilege to do so .... They ought to be
given latitude to enable them to write the program they want." 115 CONG. REC. 34106
(1969).
54. 475 F.2d at 454.
55. 566 F.2d at 395.
56. 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2)(iii) (1976).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1976).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1970).
59. 566 F.2d at 395.
60. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
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which supplied operating fuel to the Youngstown plant. The Ohio unemployment compensation statute disqualified persons from benefits if
their unemployment was due to a strike at any factory owned or
operated by the same employer, even if the factory on strike was not
where the applicant worked.6" Hodory sued the Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services alleging that the Ohio statute conflicted with
provisions of the Social Security Act 2 which he claimed entitled him to
63
unemployment benefits.
The Court determined that despite Hodory's unfortunate situation,
"Congress did not intend to require that the States give coverage to
every person involuntarily unemployed.""16 In fact, in reviewing the
history of the pertinent legislation, the Court concluded that "involuntariness" of unemployment was not the key consideration in the
Senate Finance Committee's Report on the Social Security Act.6" The
Court noted that while the report recognized that a federally defined
scope of coverage would facilitate uniform administration of state
compensation plans,
it nonetheless recommended the form of... scheme that exists today...
namely, federal involvement primarily through tax incentives to encourage state-run programs. . . . "The plan for unemployment compensation that we suggest contemplates that the States shall have broad
freedom to set up the type of unemployment compensation they wish.
We believe that all matters in which uniformity is not absolutely essential
' 66
should be left to the States.
The Court also notes, in the same Senate report, a section entitled
"Suggestions for State Legislation" which asserted: "[S]tates should
have freedom in determining their own waiting periods, benefit rates,
maximum-benefit periods, etc." 6 7 Similarly, the Court noted that the
cover page of the draft bills stated that it is the final responsibility and
the right of each state to determine for itself just what type of legisla§ 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Page 1973).

61.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

62.

42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1970).

63. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) conditions federal contributions on the state's intention
to pay benefits "when due"; Hodory contended that "when due" meant when a person was involuntarily unemployed.
64. 431 U.S. at 483.
65. Plaintiff Hodory, in support of his interpretation of § 503(a)(1), quoted the
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY,

reprinted in

HEARINGS ON S.

1130 BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 74th CONG; 1ST SESS., 1311, 1328

(1935): "To serve its purpose, unemployment compensation must be paid only to
workers involuntarily unemployed." 431 U.S. at 482.
66. 431 U.S. at 483 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, reprinted in HEARINGS, supra note 65, at 1326-27.
67.

S. Rep., supra note 65, at 1327.
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tion it desires. 68 Finally the Court asserted that when Congress wished
to impose or forbid a condition for compensation, it was able to do so
in explicit terms,69 thus setting the stage for New York Telephone's
comparison of analogous areas. The Hodory Court concluded that
neither the Social Security Act nor the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
was intended to restrict the States' freedom to legislate in this area. 0
Although New York Telephone modeled its analysis of intent on
Hodory, there are several distinctions which may restrict Hodory's usefulness in support of the Second Circuit decision. First, Hodory is distinguishable on its facts. The Ohio statute in Hodory refused
unemployment benefits to a nonparticipant in a labor dispute and so
could be argued as not directly interfering with free collective bargaining. In contrast, the New York statute authorizes strikers to collect
benefits, regardless of their participation in the strike, after eight
weeks."' That the Hodory case could be restricted to its facts is suggested by the Court: "Congress did not intend to restrict the ability of
the States to legislate with respect to persons in appellee's position." 7 2
The qualification would allow the Court to find that Congress did intend to restrict the states' payments to strikers.
A further distinction is that Hodory expressly refused to decide
whether the statute conflicted with the National Labor Relations Act;
the Court limited its finding of no preemption to the Social Security
Act (now the Federal Unemployment Tax Act).73 The court points out
in New York Telephone, however, that the National Labor Relations
Act makes no mention of unemployment compensation and that the
Act, like the Social Security Act, is one of several major legislative acts
which embody the federal policy of free collective bargaining. '
The Second Circuit concluded, as did the Supreme Court in
Hodory, that congressional intent was not ambivalent or unclear, that
in fact Congress intended the states to enjoy legislative freedom in this
area. With the decision based on this threshold determination, and
with Hodory as the precedential model on which its analysis of intent
was patterned, the court found it unnecessary to go further in applying
the Grinnell two-pronged standard.
But if the Supreme Court distinguishes Hodory on its facts, or
restricts its congressional intent analysis to the states' ability to formu68. 431 U.S. at 485 (quoting Soc. Sec. Board, Draft Bill for State Unemployment
Compensation of Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Type (1936)).
69. 431 U.S. at 488.
70. Id. at 488-89.
71. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 590.9, 592.1 (McKinney 1977).
72. 431 U.S. at 484.
73. Id. at 475, n.3.
74. 566 F.2d at 391.
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late disqualifying provisions, the New York Telephone decision will be
vulnerable to the vagaries of legislative interpretation. A rejection by

the Court of Hodory's applicability to the strikers' benefits cases and a
finding of ambiguous congressional intent will be likely to subject the
issue to the factual impact analysis suggested by the second prong of

Grinnell. And a narrow reading of Hodory, rejecting its applicability
to New York Telephone, is not altogether unlikely despite the Court's
recent trend toward protecting state autonomy.
V.

POSSIBLE FACTORS IN THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT

While the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the situation
presented in New York Telephone, there are some indications of factors likely to be considered.
A. Impact on the Neutrality of the BargainingProcess
Several cases speak to the Court's presentiments concerning the

payment of unemployment benefits to strikers. Hodory reveals that the
Court assumes some impact:"' "The employer's costs go up with every

laid-off worker who is qualified to collect unemployment."", Similarly, in deciding a mootness question in a case involving welfare benefits,

the Court said, "It cannot be doubted that. .. state welfare assistance
for striking workers .. .pervades every work stoppage, affects every

existing collective-bargaining agreement, and is a factor lurking in the
background of every incipient labor contract." 7
Unless Hodory is distinguished or restricted, it would appear that
the congressional intent analysis of that case would lead to a similar

conclusion in New York Telephone. If Congress intended to afford
states the discretion to disqualify certain persons from benefits, it may
have also intended to provide states the discretion to include certain
75. Other courts have made the same assumption, although such a reference point
is not compelled by the record. The district court in New York Telephone Co. v. New
York Dep't of Labor prefaced its factual analysis with a statement indicating a less
than impartial approach: "I regard it as a fundamental truism that the availability to,
or expectation or receipt of a substantial weekly tax-free payment of money by, [sic] a
striker is a substantial factor affecting his willingness to go on strike or . . . to remain
on strike .... This being a truism, one ... would expect to find confirmation of it
everywhere." 434 F. Supp. ati813-14. Despite Grinnell's warning to build an evidentiary record on relevant figures and statistical data, to be weighted depending on "the
extent to which they [the statisticians] considered and controlled for other factors
potentially responsible for any disparities," 475 F.2d at 459, the district court found
confirmation of its "truism" in a random-digit phone survey of 1200 persons, only
eight of whom had ever been on strike. 434 F. Supp. at 816; see Brief for Appellee,
New York Telephone Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977).
76. 431 U.S. at 492.
77. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 124 (1974).
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persons in their plans. If the Court is disinclined to view the benefits
benignly, but cannot fashion a congressional intent rationale which
would deny state unemployment benefits to strikers, it may well turn
to the impact analysis.
The assumption that the payment of benefits is bound to impact on
the bargaining process presupposes that a neutrality consistent with
federal policy exists when the benefits are not paid. The counterargument is that the employer is usually financially capable of greater endurance than his workers and that the payment of unemployment
benefits merely adjusts the unequal balance between the parties closer
to neutrality."
The denial of benefits, then, may be construed as a negotiating
advantage to employers. The majority of the working population is
eligible for compensation when unemployed; disqualifications are the
exception. Arguments that the prospect of benefits forces employers
into undesirable settlements are no more forceful than contentions that
the denial of benefits is coercive on employees.7 9 National policy has
long recognized striking as a legitimate economic weapon to effect
desirable changes or to protect rights given employees by legislation or
by contract."0
Impact analysis, if undertaken by the Court in deciding New York
Telephone, might consider whether the $75 per week in benefits is large
enough to motivate workers both to strike and to prolong the strike
beyond the time they would otherwise have returned to work. For theCourt to decide on the facts of the New York Telephone case, however, would only invite litigation to determine what amount is too
minimal to have an impact and would not settle the more compelling
general issue of whether or not all state unemployment benefits interfere with the federal policy of free collective bargaining.
B.

Economic Weapons

An optional approach would be to view the unemployment compensation as simply another economic weapon available to one of the
parties and thus consistent with the federal policy of collective bargaining based on the free play of economic forces. The district court in
78. Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49
YALE L.J. 461, 465 (1940). There is evidence that the government's policy is not one of
absolute neutrality. Labor legislation which comprises the "balance" struck by Congress is subject to substantial flex and change particularly in areas such as workmen's
compensation and minimum wage. Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964);
Shadur, supra note 1, at 297.
79. Id. at 297-98.
80. Id. at 299.
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New York Telephone spent considerable time establishing what should
be obvious: that strikers used the money, were generally thankful to
have it, and attached some importance to its usefulness.' But economic weapons are not anathema to the federal policy of free collective bargaining. In fact, such weapons are part of the congressional
scheme whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left
others free to operate. 2 In Local 20 Teamsters Union v. Morton,83 the
Court recognized that attempting to induce secondary boycotts is a
legitimate economic weapon, and disallowed Ohio's attempt to restrict
this weapon by awarding damages to the boycotted employer.
That the state made available the economic weapon in New York
Telephone should not mandate its curtailment. The federal government already plays a vast role in structuring certain economic forces,
and the states have not been altogether precluded from acting in the
labor field. In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.," the Court upheld a state damages remedy for violence on
the picket line. The Court thus allowed the state to provide an
employer with an economic weapon, a damages remedy unavailable
under federal law, pertaining to an area of conduct clearly within the
federal jurisdiction. Further, New York's purpose in providing benefits is not to take sides in a labor dispute; the benefits are designed as a
social remedy for the ills of unemployment and are generally available
to all state citizens.
C.

The State's Interest

The state's interest in providing unemployment benefits has not
been thoroughly examined in New York Telephone, despite the importance attached to that variable in the Grinnell formula. The district
court examined the legislative history of New York's compensation
plan, and concluded that the coverage for strikers was included in the
statute for administrative convenience." The district court concluded
that the state's interest was too inconsequential to be a factor in the
decision. 86
To assess the state's interest, Grinnell advised examining the empirical evidence and expert economic testimony of the nature of the
strike's long-term impact on pricing and competitiveness and the shortterm impact on consumer demand. 7 Also relevant are such secondary
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

434 F. Supp. at 814-16.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
377 U.S. 252 (1964).
347 U.S. 656 (1954).
434 F. Supp. at 818.

86.

Id. at 819.

87.

475 F.2d at 461.
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effects as violence caused by strikers' bitterness attendant upon the
hardships of the strike, and avoidance of economic stagnation from
the termination of income. 88 The Director 9 of the New York plan
testified in the trial court that the state's benefits not only assist striking workers to pay essential living expenses, but also preserve the
employer's labor force intact and ease the effects on local economy. 90
The Second Circuit, while noting the stated public policy of New
York's labor law and the testimony of the Director as to the objectives
of the statute," did not incorporate these factors into its decision.
Precedent for considering the state's interest is clearly present in Grinnell and in Hodory, and an analysis of New York's interest may be
forthcoming on certiorari.
The Supreme Court in Hodory found that the Ohio statute bore a
rational relation to a legitimate state interest, and was thus constitutionally sound."2 Protection of the fund, the Court asserted, is a legitimate state interest, and the Ohio statute furthered that interest by disqualifying certain unemployed workers.
Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The State has
chosen to leave this lever in existence for situations in which the employer
has locked out his employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made
the strike move. Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of
wisdom of this form of state "neutrality" in labor disputes, we cannot
say that the approach taken by Ohio is irrational. 9
In Ohio, the state interest sometimes favors the employer. In New
York, the state has an interest in employees' welfare and in the community as a whole. 9" If the Court found the Ohio statute rational
regardless of the statute's lack of neutrality toward strikers, the New
York statute should withstand the same analysis. 5
D.

Federalism Concerns

Recent Court decisions have given greater deference to legitimate
state interests. The Court in National League of Cities v. Usery96 per88. Id.
89. Harold Kasper, Director of New York State Unemployment Insurance Division.
90. 566 F.2d at 393, n.5.
91. Id. at 393.
92. 431 U.S. at 489-93.
93. Id. at 492.
94. 566 F.2d at 393, n.5.
95. Such an analysis is not compelled in New York Telephone, however, as it was
in Hodory, where the plaintiff alleged due process and equal protection violations.
96. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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mitted a state to exclude certain state employees from the minimum
9
wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, ' despite congressional amendments extending the Act to such employees. The decision
was founded on the power of the states to regulate their own internal
affairs. 98 In a case dealing directly with labor preemption, the Court
recently determined that state trespass laws are operative even when
those charged are picketers whose conduct was subject to NLRB jurisdiction.99

0
Similarly, the Court in Malone v. White Motor Corp.1' upheld
Minnesota's right to compel bankrupt employers to fund employee
pension plans as promised. 10 ' The case held that the National Labor
Relations Act neither expressly nor impliedly forecloses state
regulatory power over pension plans that may be the subject of collective bargaining.' 2 In analyzing congressional intent regarding the
regulation of pension plans, the Court noted that: "Congress was
aware that the States had thus far attempted little regulation of pension plans. The federal act was envisioned as laying a foundation for
future state regulation."' 0 3 The same can be said of unemployment
compensation plans. Congressional awareness and inaction, and congressional anticipation of varied state plans' 0 ' can be construed as intent not to preempt.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The New York Telephone decision draws on part of the formula
supplied by Grinnell and Hodory to reach a threshold decision of no
congressional intent to preempt. New York Telephone reinforced a
trend toward protection of state activity by upholding the validity of
unemployment benefits to strikers in New York, a result which is contrary to recent decisions which have overturned such benefits. The
results are thus a significant departure from labor law preemption patterns, and would be supported by a favorable reading of Hodory.
Should Hodory be distinguished or restricted, the Supreme Court's
treatment of the case on review may well involve an assessment of the
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
98. 426 U.S. at 845-51.
99. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 98
S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
100. 98 S. Ct. 1185 (1978).
101. The case developed before the passage of the Federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). ERISA expressly preempts states in the regulation of covered plans.
102. 98 S. Ct. at 1194.
103. Id. at 1193.
104. 566 F.2d at 391-92.
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alleged impact of such benefits. It is unclear, however, whether
neutrality would result from a denial of the benefits or the granting of
them. A decision consistent with Hodory's finding of no preemption
would help to provide a pragmatic solution to this knotty problem of
state statutes which indirectly impact on federal labor regulation. Additionally, the states' legitimate police power interests in the welfare of
their citizens would be accommodated. Such a result is not unlikely in
light of the recent tendency of the Court to adopt a stance protective
of state interests, even in the area of labor regulation, an area traditionally reserved for federal interests.
Jane Cooper-Hill
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